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Abst ract - - In  this paper, we study a production control problem in a competitive environment. 
Two firms produce the same product and compete against each other. The demand is random and 
so is the production capacity. Each firm needs to decide how much it will produce daily without 
knowing what the competitor is doing. If it produces too much, the firm has to pay an inventory 
cost. If it produces too little, unsatisfied customers are turned away to its competitor. The daily 
demand is randomly allocated between the two firms. We consider a finite planning horizon. The 
control problem is formulated as a finite dynamic game. Algorithms are developed to determine 
the control policies of interest. Numerical examples are presented. Comparisons are made with the 
control policies from a single-firm optimization model. 
Keywords - -P roduct ion  scheduling, Stochastic dynamic games. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Product ion  control in a competit ive nvironment is of importance,  since companies need to com- 
pete against  each other to at t ract  customers and to gain market  share. One of the decisions that  
a manufactur ing company needs to make is to decide how much to produce to meet the customer 
demand.  However, the customer demand is usual ly random. If it produces too much, a firm has 
to pay an inventory cost. If  it produces too little, unsatisfied customers will go to its compet i tors.  
As a consequence, the product ion decision of a firm will affect the outcome of customer orders 
and, in some cases, will influence the decisions of other firms. 
The problem of competi t ive product ion control has received scant attention. In [1], Levitan and 
Shubik modeled the price compet i t ion between two product ion systems as an infinite stochastic 
game. K i rman and Sobel [2] studied inventory control in an N-f i rm price compet i t ion,  and 
formulated it as an infinite dynamic game. In both models above, product ion systems are assumed 
to be perfect ly reliable. In [3], Li investigated the role of inventory in a del ivery-t ime compet i t ion 
with shortage costs. In [4], a stochastic dynamic model was developed for a two-firm compet i t ion 
with random system failures. The demand on each day is al located between the two firms in a 
determinist ic  manner.  
In this paper,  we study a quant i ty  compet i t ion between two firms which are subject  to ran- 
dom failures. The product ion capacit ies are random. The dai ly demand is al located randomly  
according to a given distr ibut ion function. The planning horizon is finite and fixed. In the next 
section, we describe the system and its dynamics.  The product ion control problem is formulated 
as a finite dynamic game. Algor i thms are developed to determine the product ion control polices 
of interest in Section 3. In Section 4, we present numerical examples. Sensit ivity analyses are 
performed by s imulat ing the systems with different parameters  and demand processes. In Sec- 
t ion 5, comparisons are made with the control policies from a single-firm opt imizat ion model. 
Section 6 summarizes the paper.  
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2. THE PRODUCTION CONTROL PROBLEM 
There are two firms which produce the same product and compete against each other. Both 
firms are prone to random failures. For Firm i, the time to fail and time to repair are assumed 
to be geometrically distributed random variables with means 1/pi and 1/ri, respectively. Break- 
downs of different firms are statistically independent. Denote by cq(k) the state of Firm i on 
Day k, which is 1 if Firm i is operational and 0 otherwise. Here and elsewhere in this paper, we 
assume that all the variables take only integer values. 
If Firm i is operational on Day k, it can produce up to its capacity Ui(k). Due to the uncertainty 
of processing times and personnel changes, the daily capacity is assumed to be random and IID 
for all i and k. It is also assumed to be bounded from below and above, 
u~ <_ u~(k) < ui', (1) 
where U/l and U~* are known nonnegative constants. The probability distribution of Ui(k), 
p(Ui(k)), is given. Let ui(k) be the production of Firm i on Day k, which satisfies 
o ~ ~(k) ~U~(k)a~(k). (2) 
The daily demand d(k) for the product is a random variable, and satisfies 
0 < d(k) <D, 
where D is the maximum demand. The distribution of d(k), p(d(k)), is known and demands on 
different days are assumed to be IID. 
The unsold products from the previous day are put into inventory of Day k in Firm i, denoted 
by Ii(k). Define Q(k) to be the unfulfilled demand on Day k which is carried over from the 
previous day. On Day k, the following holds 
Ii(k) Q(k) = 0, i = 1,2. (3) 
Let ei(k) be the total amount of available products in Firm i on Day k, which is the sum of 
the current inventory and production, 
e,(k) = ~,(k) +&(k). 
Let E(k) be the total demand on Day k which is given by 
E(k) = d(k) + Q(k). 
On Day k, each unit of the total demand E(k) is allocated to Firm i with a given probability qi 
such that 
2 
E qi = 1. 
{=1 
Let ai(k) be the demand allocated to Firm i on Day k, which takes integer values from 0 to E(k) 
with the probability distribution 
p{ai(k)=nlE(k)}= ( E(k)n )q?(1-qi) E(k)-n. (4) 
Let 
~(k) = {~(k) ,~(k)} ,  ~(k) = {~,(k) ,~(k)},  U(k) = {Cq(k), U2(k)}, 
I (~)  = { / l (k ) , I2 (k )} ,  o'(k) = {O' l (k) ,o '2(k)}  . 
Denote by xi(k) the sales of Firm i on Day k. If the demand ai(k) is greater than or equal to 
the available inventory ei(k), then Firm i sells all its available goods. Otherwise, the remaining 
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demand will be transferred to its competitor. If the other firm cannot satisfy the transferred 
customers either, they will be carried over to the next day as unfulfilled demand, attached to 
neither firm. If the demand is less than the available inventory, unsold products are put into the 
inventory of the next day. In summary, we have 
ei(k), 
a i (k)+aj(k)  - ej(k), 
if ai(k) >_ ei(k); 
if ei(k) - ai(k) <_ aj(k) - ej(k), 
and ai(k) < ei(k), (j ¢ i); 
if ei(k) - ai(k) > aj(k) - ej(k), 
and aj(k) > ej(k), (j ¢ i); 
if cri(k) < ei(k) and 
aj(k) <_ e3(k), (j ¢ i). 
The dynamics of inventories and unfulfilled emand are governed by 
and 
Ii(k + 1) = Ii(k) + ui(k) - xi(k), i = 1, 2, 
(5) 
(6) 
2 2 
Q(k + 1) = Ea i (k )  - Ex i (k ) .  (7) 
i=1  i=1 
REMARK. The nonnegativity of I(k) and Q(k) and the condition (3) are assured implicitly. 
The planning horizon is finite. We consider a period of N days, indexed from 0 to N - 1. At 
the beginning of Day 0, the system is initialized, 
0 I i (O)=I  °, Q(O)=Q°, Ui(O)=U °, c~i(O)=o~ i, i=1 ,2 .  (8) 
On Day k, the inventory Ii(k) and the unfulfilled demand Q(k) are carried over from the 
previous day. The system state o~i(k ) and capacity Ui(k) are observed according to the given 
distribution functions. The decision of Firm i is to decide how much to produce that day without 
knowing what the competitor is doing. At the end of the day, the demand (k) is observed. Then, 
the total demand E(k) are allocated between the two firms according to (4). The sales xi(k) is 
realized according to (5), and Ii(k + 1) and Q(k + 1) are determined, using (6) and (7), for the 
next day. 
In the production control problem, the state variables are I(k), Q(k), U(k), and ~(k), the 
stochastic disturbances are d(k), the control variables are u(k), (k = 1, . . . ,  N -  1). The feedback 
information pattern is used in the decision making. That is, two firms make their decisions imul- 
taneously and independently, based on the information of current system state and production 
history. Let Sk be the set of feasible system states on Day k, 
Sk = {(I(k), Q(k), U(k), c~(k))}. 
The control variable ui(k) can take values from a nonempty set f~i(k), (i = 1, 2; k = 0, 1 , . . . ,  N - l )  
~h(k) = {u~(k) I 0 ~< u~(k) <_ U~(k)~(k)}. (9) 
Let ~ik be a mapping function from Sk to f~i(k), 
ltik(I(k),Q(k),U(k),tx(k)) • 12i(k), for all (I(k),Q(k),U(k), ~(k)) • Sk. (10) 
We consider the class of control aws (also called policies or strategies), 7ri (i = 1, 2), which consist 
of a sequence of control functions, 
71"/ = {/-~i0, P ' /1 . . . .  , I J ' iN -1}  • 
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Let us consider the following sample sequences, 
d = {d(0), d(1), . . . ,  d(N - 1)}; 
a = {a(0) ,a (1 ) , . . . ,a (N-  1)}; 
U = {U(0) ,U(1) , . . . ,U (N-  1)}; 
E = {E(1) ,E (2 ) , . . . ,E (N-  1)}; 
a = {a(0) ,g (1 ) , . . . ,a (N-  1)}. 
A sample of d specifies a possible demand sequence from Day 0 to Day N - 1, and outcomes 
of a and U determine the system status for both firms during the planning horizon. For given 
d, a, and U, E(k) is determined by a(k - 1), u(k - 1), and I (k - 1) in a deterministic manner. 
Given E, a determines the demand allocation of each day during the planning horizon. Their 
distribution functions are well defined, 
p{d} = p{d(1)}p{d(2)} . . .p{d(N - 1)}; 
p{~} = p {~(1)I  ~(0)}p {~(2)I  ~(1)} . . .p{a~(N-  1) [ a i (N -2)};  
p {O:} ~-~ p {OL1) p {O~2} ; 
p{Ui} = p{Ui(O)}p{Ui(1)}. . .p{Ui(N - 1)}; 
p{U} = p{U1}p{U2}; 
p{a [E} =p{a(1)  l E(1)} p{a(2) l E (2 )} . . .p{a(N-  1) [E (N-  1)}. 
Denote by/~i (_> 0) the profit per unit sales and by 5i (_> 0) the cost per unit inventory for 
Firm i during the planning horizon, (i = 1, 2; k = 0 , . . . ,  N - 1). In addition, if there are unsold 
products at the end of Day N, i.e., I i (N) > 0, Firm i has to pay 5if for each unit of the leftover 
inventory. For given control policies 7rl and rr2, the average payoff of Firm i is 
/ ~-"~ N 1 } 
Ji(Trl, 7r2) =  d,o,u E t , i=1 ,2 .  (11) 
We seek three policies for each firm, called security, hazard, and Nash policies. The security 
policy maximizes the minimum payoff and the hazard policy maximizes the maximum payoff. 
The Nash policies determine an equilibrium point such that there is no incentive for either firm 
to change its policy. The policies are defined as follows. 
DEFINITION 1. A strategy #i is called the security policy of Firm i if it attains the security 
payoff, 
Z=max min E E [~=o[~ixi (k) - iS J i (k)] - (S i f I i (N ) i = 1,2. 
7ri I lrj,j#i {d,a,U} {alE} 
DEFINITION 2. A policy fri is called the hazard policy of Firm i if it attains the hazard payoff, 
{ ,}} Ji -= max max E E j3ixi(k) - 5ili(k)] - 5i l I i (N , (i = 1, 2). ~ri 7rj,j•i {d,a,U) {alE} 
DEFINITION 3. A pair of policies, {r~, 7r~ }, are called Nash policies if they satisfy 
./l(Trl,Tr~) _< Jl(W~,Tr~), for all 7h, 
, J 171-* . \  J2(Tr~ 7r2) <_ 2(1,7r2), for all 7r2. 
Ji(r~, w~) is referred to as Nash payoff for Firm i. 
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DEFINITION 4. A pair of policies Or~, r~) is said to be better than another pair of policies 
(~i', ~') if 
I t . J1 (Ir~ , 7r~ !) -< J1 (Trl, r2), 
J2(~ri', r~') < J2(~rl, r~); 
and at least one oE the inequalities i strict. 
DEFINITION 5. A pair of Nash policies is said to be admissible iE there exist no better pairs o[ 
Nash policies. 
To this point, we have formulated a dynamic game model for the competitive production control 
problem• In the next section, we develop computation algorithms to determine the strategies 
defined above. 
3. COMPUTATION ALGORITHMS 
In this section, we develop algorithms to determine the security, hazard, and Nash policies 
and payoffs for each firm• In essence, the security (hazard) policy for each firm is a maximin 
(maximax) control strategy• Finding such a policy is an optimization problem which can be solved 
using existing dynamic programming (DP) techniques• Here, we introduce two DP algorithms to 
determine the security and hazard policies and payoffs for each firm without giving derivations• 
Interested readers are referred to the literature of stochastic dynamic programming or more 
specifically to Bertsekas [5]• 
ALGORITHM 1. (Determining security policies) 
Ji,N( I ( N ), Q( N ), U ( N) , a( N) ) = -6~ l li( N); 
ffi,k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = max ~ min 
-~I~(k) + E 
{V(k+l),(x(k+l)lc~(k)) 
E [f~xi(k) 
{d(k),a(k)lE(k)} 
J i ,a+l(I(k + 1), Q(k + 1), U(k + 1), c~(k + 1) ) ]} ;  
( i=  1,2;k = 0 ,1 , . . . ,N -  1). 
ALGORITHM 2. (Determining hazard policies) 
3~,N( I ( N ), Q( N), U ( N), a( g)  ) = -Sif Ii( Y); 
J~,k(I(k),Q(k),U(k),(~(k))= max ~ min 
~, (k)en~ (k) ( ~ (k)enj (k),j¢i 
E [ f~x~(k) 
{d(k),a(k)lE(k)} 
E , ] i ,k+l( I (k+l) ,Q(k+l) ,U(k+l) ,o~(k+l)) l}  ; 
{U(k+l),a(k+l)la(k)} 
(i = 1,2;k = 0 ,1 , . . . ,N -  1). 
The following two theorems link the DP algorithms above to the security and hazard policies for 
each individual firm. Readers are referred to Bertsekas [5] for detailed proofs for similar problems. 
PROPOSITION 1. 
j~ = j~,o(i o, QO, U o, no), i = 1, 2. 
Farthermore, if ~i(k) = f~ik(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) optimizes the right sides of Algorithm 1 for 
each ( I ( k ), Q( k ), U ( k ), a( k ) ) and k, the control aw ~ri = {fii0,. • •, fiig-1} is a security policy for 
Firm i, (i = 1, 2). 
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PROPOSITION 2. 
Ji = Ji,o( I0, QO, u 0, c~o), i = 1, 2. 
Fhrthermore, if ui( k ) = f~ik ( I ( k ), Q( k ), U ( k ), a(k)) optimizes the right sides of Algorithm 2 for 
each (I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) and k, the control aw 77i = {f~m,...,/2iN-i} is a hazard policy t'or 
Firm i, (i = 1,2). 
In the following, we determine the Nash policies and payoffs for each firm. For the time being, 
we assume that there exists a pair of Nash policies (~,  7r~). The existence of Nash policies will 
be addressed later in this section. 
If ~ is known, then Firm 1 can determine its Nash payoff J~ and policy 7r~ by solving a 
optimization problem (see Definition 3), 
and 
-- max. 1 Jl(Trl,Tr~) 
N-lk=0 -61Ii(k)] } max,, Ed,a,U. E [/~lXl(k)-~lfIl(N) , 
[ --Tr~ 
* ----- a rgmaxJ l ( r l ,~) .  
Similarly, if ~r~ is given, Firm 2 would like to solve its optimization problem, 
and 
= maxr 2 J2(Tr~,Tr2) N-1 } 
=max.2Ed,,~,u {k~=o[/32x2(k)-6212(k)]-62II2(N) , 
,q 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
and 
I~lk(X(k),* Q(k), U(k), o~(k)) = Ulk • 
#2k(I(k),* Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = u2k* ," 
where Ji*k(.) is defined as follows: 
Stage N: 
J[g(I(g), Q(N), U(N), a(Y)) = -61111(N); 
J~N(I(N), Q(N), U(N), a(N) ) = -62II2(N); 
k = 0 , . . . ,N -  1, 
Stage k (k=0, . . . ,N -  1): 
(15) 
(16) 
J~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = max~l(~)cnl(k) E{d(k),~(k) I E(k)} [/31xy(k) - 6111(k) 
+ E{u(k+l),,~(k+l)l,~(k)}J~,k+i(I(k  1), Q(k + 1), U(k + 1),c~(k + 1))],,*; 
J~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = maxu2(~)ea2(k ) E(d(k),,~(k) I E(k)} [/32xu(k) - 6212(k) 
+ E{u(k+l),,~(k+l)la(k)IJ'~,k+i (I(k + 1), Q(k + 1), U(k + 1), a(k + 1))]u~ ;
(17) 
j~ __ j~o( i o, QO, u o, ao); 
g~ = j~o(iO, QO, u o, so); 
7r 2 = argmax J2(lr~, lr2). 
qr2 
Under the given conditions, each problem above is a basic dynamic programming problem and 
can be solved using a standard DP algorithm. However, since the Nash policies (Try, lr~) are not 
known a priori, problems (12) and (13) need to be solved simultaneously. Therefore, combining 
the two DP algorithms for both firms, the Nash payoffs and strategies hould satisfy 
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where 
= arg J;k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), 
(18) 
u~k = arg J~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k) ). 
In appearance, the formulation above is nothing more than writing two DP algorithms to- 
gether stage by stage. However, it is important o notice that at stage k, for a given state 
(I(k), Q(k), U(k), ~(k)), J~k(') (i ---- 1,2) in (17) represent a pure strategy Nash equilibrium point 
of a bimatrix game with the payoff matrices given by (see [6]), 
Jlk(ul(k),u2(k)) = E{d(k),a(k) ] E(k)} IfllXl(k) -- 6111(k) 
I= 
+ 1),Q(k + 1),U(k + 1),a(k + 1))[; +E{u(k+l),a(k+l)[c~(k)}J;,k+l(I( k 
.1 
J2k(ul(k),u~(k)) = E{d(k),~(k) I E(k)} ]fl2x2(k) - 6212(k) 
t .  
+ 1),Q(k + 1),U(k + 1),a(k + 1))]; q-E{u(k+l ) ,a(k+l ) ]a(k)} J~,k+l ( I (k  
J 
for all Ul(k) e fll(k) and us(k) • ~2(k). 
(19) 
Therefore, Nash policies and payoffs, if they exist, can be determined by solving a sequence of 
interrelated bimatrix games recursively. 
Now, recall that we assumed the existence of Nash policies. However, it is well-known that the 
pure strategy equilibrium points may not exist for a bimatrix game. In that situation, a common 
method is to adopt randomized policies (also called mixed strategies) to ensure the existence 
of an equilibrium point. In our particular case, however, randomized control policies are not 
well-defined and hard to implement. It would be difficult to convince a production manager that 
the optimal control policy can be decided only by coin tossing. In fact, Dresher [7] reported that 
many decision makers may be reluctant o accept he operational notion of a mixed strategy. 
Due to this concern, in place of randomized strategy, we introduce a pseudo-Nash policy which 
always exists and is meaningful. 
For the existence of a pair of Nash policies (Try, 7r~), each of the bimatrix games, defined in (19) 
for all states (I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) • Sk and k • {0,. . . ,  g - 1}, must retain a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium point. If any of the games does not have a pure strategy solution, we can 
conclude that there exists no Nash policies for the production control problem. When such a 
situation is encountered, we assume that both firms will play their security strategies. That is, 
for a given state at stage k, if J'k(.) (i = 1,2) do not exist in (19), security policies and payoffs 
will be adopted in place of Nash solutions, 
Q(k), U(k), =  MI(k), Q(k), U(k), 
(20) 
J.~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = Jik(f~lk(.),/~2k(.)); 
where tbik(.) and Jik(.) are defined in Algorithm 1 and Formulation (19), respectively. The 
resulting solutions are referred to as pseudo-Nash policies. Since the security policies and payoffs 
always exist, so do pseudo-Nash policies and payoffs. 
Now we are ready to construct the algorithm for the Nash policies. If Nash policies exist, the 
following algorithm will find an admissible pair. Otherwise, it generates a pair of pseudo-Nash 
policies. 
ALGORITHM 3. 
Step O: Collect input data and assign terminal costs, 
J;N (I(N), Q(N), U(N), a(N)) = -~lf~'l (Y); 
J~N(I(N), Q(N), U(N), c~(N)) = -62II2(N); for all (I(N), Q(N), U(N), a(N)) • SN. 
(21) 
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Step N - k: For a #ven state (I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) • Sk at stage k (k = N - 1 , . . . ,  0), set up 
the bimatrix game with payoff matrices, 
Jlk(Ul(k),u2(k)) = E{d(k),a(k) ] E(k)} [fllXl(k) - 61Ii(k) 
+E{v(k+l),~(k+l)l~(k)}J;,k+1(I(k + 1),Q(k + 1), U(k + 1), a(k + 1))]; 
J2k(Ul(k),us(k) ) = E{d(k),~(k) l E(k)} [f lsxs(k)- 62Is(k) 
+E{v(k+l),~(k+l)l~(k)}J~,k+l (I(k + 1), Q(k + 1), U(k + 1), a(k + 1))]; 
for a11 Ul(k) • f~l(k) and us(k) • ~2(k). 
(22) 
and solve for Ji*k(.) and #i'k(') such that 
J~k(I(k),Q(k),V(k),a(k)) = glk (U*lk,U~k) >-- Jlk (Ul(k),U~k), for all ul(k) • ill(k); 
J~*k(I(k),Q(k), U(k),a(k)) = J2k (U~k,U~k) >-- glk (U~k,U2(k)), for a11 us(k) • f~s(k); 
(23) 
#~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = arg J~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)); 
#~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = arg J~k(X(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)). 
The linear-time algorithm in [8] may be used for finding pure strategy Nash equilibria of the 
bimatrix game. If solution exists, return an admissible pair of policies ui* k and payoffs J'k('); 
otherwise, report that there exist no Nash policies and let 
#i*k(X(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = f~ik(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)); 
J*k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = Jik(fqk(.), f~2k(.)). 
Step N+I: If all the bimatrix games above have Nash solutions, report the Nash policies and 
payoffs; otherwise return the pseudo-Nash solutions, 
j ;  = j;o(i  o, Qo, U o, ao); 
j~ = j~o(iO Qo uO,aO); 
and 
#~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = arg J~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)); 
#~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)) = arg J~k(I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)); 
( I (k) ,Q(k),U(k),a(k))•Sk; k=0, . . . ,Y -1 .  
From the discussions above, we have established the following result. 
PROPOSITION 3. Algorithm 3 processes the competitive production control problem. By process- 
ing, we mean that the algorithm will either produce an admissible pair of Nash policies or show 
that no Nash policies exist and generate a pair of pseudo-Nash policies in finite time. 
PROOF. We have shown above that Algorithm 3 will generate a pair of admissible Nash policies 
if they exist, or a pair of pseudo-Nash policies, otherwise. It is not difficult to see that the 
solution will be attained in finite time because we are searching within a finite and bounded set, 
{J(~l, ~2)}. m 
So far in this paper, we have formulated a stochastic dynamic game model for a competitive 
production control problem and developed algorithms for solutions of interest. In the next section, 
we calculate the security, hazard, and Nash policies and payoffs using the algorithms for some 
numerical cases and perform simulations to observe system behaviors in competition. 
4. A NUMERICAL  STUDY 
In this section, we present numerical examples of the policies and payoffs determined using 
the algorithms of the previous ection. We also perform simulation for the situations that the 
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two firms compete against each other using the policies generated, to observe the system behav- 
ior. Sensitivity analysis is made by gradually changing the system parameters and the demand 
processes. Let us first consider a case with the following parameters. 
Case 1: 
F i rml :  rl =0.5, py =0-1, U11=4, Uh ,=4,  
/31=20, 51 =2,  51 I=4,  q1=0.5. 
Firm 2: r2 -- 0.5, P2 = 0.4, V21 -- 8, V2u = 8, 
/~2=20, 52=2,  52 /=4,  q2=0-5. 
N = 10; 11(0) =/2(0) = Q(0) = 0; al(0) = c~2(0) = 1; Ul(0) = 4; U2(O) --- 8. 
d E {3, 4 , . . . ,  12}, with a uniform distribution. 
In this case, both firms have constant production capacities. Firm 1 may produce up to four units 
on a given day if it is operational, and produce nothing if it is down. The average production 
capacity of Firm 1 is 
E(alU1) = ( r r l - -~ l )  U1 = 3.33. 
Firm 2 has an average production capacity 
Here, the average daily demand is 
12 1 
E(d) = ]-6 ~ ' i  = 7.5. 
i----3 
With equal probabilities (ql = q2 = 0.5), the daily demand is allocated to the two firms. There- 
fore, if ignoring the competition, each firm should have 3.75 average daily demand which is great 
than the average capacity of Firm 1, but insufficient for Firm 2. 
The algorithms 1, 2 and 3 were implemented using a C program to generate the production 
control policies. For the given system, the expected payoffs for each firm are calculated and listed 
in the following, 
Firm 1 : J1  = 608.6, J~ = 622.0, J l  = 688.6. (24) 
Firm 2 : J2  = 692.4, J~ = 693.7, J2 = 947.3. 
We see that the Nash payoff is bounded by the security and hazard payoffs for each firm. Further, 
the hazard payoff for each firm is substantially arger than the other two. This is because the 
hazard policy assumes that the competitor will make sacrifice whenever possible. That would 
never happen in a noncooperative competition. Thus, the hazard payoff does not reflect the 
quality of the corresponding control policy. Nevertheless, it does provide a upper bound on 
possible payoffs. 
In the sequel of this section, we simulate the competition that the two firms play different 
policies against each other. Since each firm has three policies, there are nine possible configura- 
tions. For each configuration, 500 simulation runs are made using different seeds for the random 
number generator. The average payoff is calculated over the 500 resulted ata sets and is listed 
in Table 1. We observe that for each firm the security and Nash policies perform equally well (the 
difference in payoffs is within the range of simulation error). The hazard policy is outperformed 
by the other two policies. 
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F/rm 1 
Table 1. The average payoffs from simulations for Case 1. 
Firm 2 
J1 Security Nash Hazard 
Security 619.7 619.4 607.8 
Nash 620.0 619.8 607.9 
Hazard 619.2 619.1 607.7 
F/rm 1 
Firm 2 
J2 Security Nash Hazard 
Security 687.8 687.6 668.4 
Nash 687.2 687.0 668.0 
Hazard 686.5 686.3 667.7 
Table 2. The security, Nash, and hazard payoffs for Cases 2-4. 
Case Jl J~ J1 i2 J~ J2 
2 604.4 618.0 688.5 694.5 695.9 947.3 
3 608.8 622.3 688.6 691.6 692.9 946.6 
4 604.7 618.2 688.5 693.7 695.1 946.6 
F/rm 1 
Table 3. The average payoffs from simulations for Case 2. 
J1 Security 
Security 614.6 
Nash 614.6 
Hazard 613.3 
Firm 2 
Nash Hazard 
614.5 602.6 
614.5 602.7 
613.2 602.0 
Firm 1 
J2 Security 
Security 691.0 
Nash 690.5 
Hazard 690.2 
Firm 2 
Nash 
690.8 
690.3 
690.0 
Hazard 
673.0 
672.7 
672.8 
F/rm 1 
Table 4. The average payoffs from simulations for Case 3. 
Firm 2 Firm ¢ 
• /1 Security Nash Hazard J2 Security Nash Hazard 
Security 619.6 619.3 607.8 Security 686.2 686.0 666.1 
Nash 619.8 619.6 607.9 Firm 1 Nash 685.6 685.4 665.8 
Hazard 619.0 618.9 607.6 Hazard 684.9 684.7 665.6 
Table 5. The average payoffs from simulations for Case 4. 
Firm 2 
J1 Security Nash Hazard 
Security 614.0 613.9 602.5 
Firm 1 Nash 614.0 613.9 602.5 
Hazard 612.8 612.7 601.8 
Firm 1 
Firm 2 
J2 Security Nash Hazard 
Security 689.5 689.4 670.6 
Nash 688.9 688.7 670.5 
Hazard 688.6 688.5 670.6 
In order  to further  eva luate the system per formance under  different policies, we per form sen- 
s i t iv i ty  analysis by s tudy ing  the fol lowing cases w i th  different system parameters .  
Case  2: Repeat  Case 1 w i th  Ull -~ 3, Ulu = 5. That  is, 
Ul (k )  E [3, 5] wi th  uni form distr ibut ion.  
Case  3: Repeat  Case 1 w i th  U21 = 7, U2~ - 9. That  is, 
U2(k) e [7, 9] wi th  uni form distr ibut ion.  
Case  4: Repeat  Case 1 wi th  Ulz = 3, Ul~ = 5., U2~ = 7, U2~ -- 9. That  is, 
U l (k )  E [3, 5] wi th uni form distr ibut ion,  
U2(k) E [7, 9] wi th  uni form distr ibut ion.  
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In Cases 2-4, each firm has the same mean capacity value as in Case 1, but different standard 
deviation. 
The expected payoffs are calculated using the algorithms discussed earlier and listed in Table 2. 
Again, we simulate ach case with different policy configurations. The simulation results are listed 
in Tables 3-5. 
We observe that the payoffs decrease when there is uncertainty in production capacities 
(Cases 1-4). Fklrthermore, the effects of uncertain capacity is greater to Firm 1 than that to 
Firm 2. (Comparing Nash-Nash payoffs in Cases 2 and 3 with that in Case 1). This might be 
an indication that capacity uncertainty affects a firm more if its average capacity is less than its 
average demand. 
In the following case, we vary the value of the maximum demand D to see the influence of 
change in demand level. 
Case 5: Repeat Case 1 with the demand process, 
d E {0, 1 , . . . ,  D}, with an uniform distribution, 
where D is the maximum demand, which is incremented from 5 to 30. 
The security, Nash, and hazard payoffs are calculated using the algorithms discussed in the 
previous section and are reported in Figures 1 and 2. We see that the Nash payoff is bounded 
by the other two payoffs and the three payoffs converge to the same value when the value of the 
maximum demand D increases. We perform simulation for the case that both firms play their 
Nash policies. The simulated Nash payoffs are indicated by the discrete circles in Figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 3 reports the average production level of each firm from simulation of Nash policies. We 
see that the average production level for each firm is an increasing function of D and converges 
to the average production capacity eventually. 
So far, we have observed some production behaviors in competition through numerical analyses. 
In the next section, we make a comparison of system performance with the control policies from 
a single-firm optimization model. 
5. COMPARISON WITH S INGLE-F IRM OPTIMIZAT ION 
In single-firm production models, the demand process is usually assumed as given, and an 
optimization problem is then formulated to achieve an effective performance. However, it is not 
clear if the control policies from the single-firm models will remain effective in a competitive 
environment where production decisions may affect the realization of the demand process. In 
this section, we formulate a single-firm optimization model, then put single-firm control policies 
in competition against those of competitive models and perform simulation to evaluate their 
performance. The following single-firm production model is used to facilitate the comparison. 
All the notations used below are the same as those defined in Section 2, except hat a super- 
script s is used for those of a single-firm model. 
The system dynamics of Firm i (i -- 1,2) is governed by 
U2 z < U:(k) <_ U: u 
o < u (k) < 
x~(k) = min{/~(k) + u~(k),d~(k) + Q~(k)}; 
/~(k + 1) =/~(k)  + u~(k) - z~(k); 
Q~(k + 1) = d~(k) + Q~(k) - x~(k). 
Firm i will optimize its expected payoff, 
d~ = maxEd~ ~ u: ~ [flix~(k) - eiI~(k)] - 6i I I~(N ) i = 1, 2. (25) 
k=O 
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To find J~, we can use existing dynamic programming techniques (see [5]). The resulting control 
policy is referred to as the single policy. The state space of the single-firm model is different 
from that of the competitive model. We need to relate the two state spaces in order to make 
the comparison. For a system state {I~(k),Q~(k), U~(k),a~(k)} in the single-firm model and 
{I(k), Q(k), U(k), a(k)} in the competitive model, we use the relationship, 
I (k) = I i(k); 
Q (k) = [qiQ(k)]; (26) 
U2(k) = Us(k); 
= 
The second equality above is a heuristic. For the single-firm model, the unfulfilled demand in a 
firm has nothing to do with the other firm. In the competitive model, the unfulfilled demand 
comes from both firms. There is no actual relationship between the two quantities. However, in 
the competitive model, since the unfulfilled demand will merge into the total demand and each 
unit of demand will be allocated to Firm i with probability qi, a portion qiQi(k) of the unfulfilled 
demand Q(k) will go to Firm i on the average. We use the following numerical example to 
facilitate the comparison. 
Case  6: 
Firm 1: r1=0.5 ,  p l=0.1 ,  U~=3,  U~=5,  
31 : 20, 61 = 2, 61f : 5. 
Firm2: r2=0.5 ,  p2=0.1 ,  U~=3,  U~ =5,  
/~2 = 20, 62 = 2, 62f = 5. 
ql = q2 ---- 0.5 
N = 10;11(0) = /2(0) = Q(0) = 0;al(0) = a2(0) = 1. d E {0 ,1 , . . . ,D} ,  with an uniform 
distribution, and the maximum demand D is incremented from 5 to 20. 
From the system dynamics in Section 2, the demand process experienced by Firm i can be 
derived as 
1 ~. ( N)qn(1-qi)N-n; (27) prob{d~(k) = n} - D + 1 n 
N=n 
(n = 0 ,1 , . . . ,D ;  i = 1,2;k = 0, . . . ,9) .  
This system in Case 6 can be separated as two single-firm models. 
Firm 1: rl =0.5,  Pl =0.1,  U~=3,  U~=5,  
8 N = 10;I~(0) = Q,(O) = O;a~(O) = 1. 
Firm 2: r2=0.5 ,  P2=O.I, U2 ~ =3,  U~=5,  
32=20,  52=2,  52 f=5.  
8 N = 10; I~(O)  = Q2(O)  = O; a~(O)  = 1. 
The demand distributions for the single-firm models are generated using (27). Table 6 lists 
the daily demand distributions for the single-firm models when the value of D is 8. We use the 
algorithms discussed previously to solve both the single-firm and the competitive model. The 
following are the resulted payoffs when D = 8. 
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Table 6. The daily demand distr ibutions for the single-firm models in Case 6 (D = 8). 
n 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
prob{d~(k) = n} 0.222 0.218 0.202 0.166 0.111 0.056 0.020 0.0043 0.0004 
prob{d~(k) = n} 0.222 0.218 0.202 0.166 0.111 0.056 0.020 0.0043 0.0004 
Table 7. The average payoffs of F i rm 1 for Case 6 (D = 8). 
Fiv~n~ 1 
J1 
Security 
Nash 
Hazard 
Single 
Security 
347.8 
348.4 
336.7 
264.5 
Firm 2 
Nash Hazard 
346.2 337.2 
346.5 337.6 
334.8 331.1 
262.8 246.8 
Single 
474.0 
474.7 
471.6 
374.3 
Table 8. The average payoffs of F i rm 2 for Case 6 (D = 8). 
Firm 1 
½ 
Security 
Nash 
Hazard 
Single 
F i rm 2 
Security Nash Hazard Single 
348.4 349.2 336.6 259.0 
346.8 347.5 334.8 257.8 
336.2 336.7 330.5 243.0 
470.2 471.2 468.4 368.1 
Firm 1 : J1  = 325.7, J~" = 345.3, J1 = 619.0, J~ = 355.2; 
(28) 
Firm 2 : J2  = 325.7, J~ = 345.2, J2 = 619.0, Y~ = 355.2. 
Following the same procedure as described in the previous section, simulations are made that 
each firm chooses its control policy from among the four of interest. The results with respect o 
D = 8 are listed in Tables 7 and 8 for the 16 possible policy configurations. We observe that 
the security and Nash policies outperform the hazard and single policies in terms of attaining 
an equilibrium. However, the payoffs are greater when both firms play their single policies than 
those when they both play their Nash policies, although the pair of single policies are not stable. 
That is, the two firms tend to change their policies until an equilibrium is attained. 
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Figure 4. The average payoffs of Firm 1 for Case 2. 
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Figures 4 and 5 depict the average payoffs from simulation for some policy combinations. 
We see when the demand level is high (D >_ 16, see Figures 4 and 5), all policy combinations 
generate identical payoffs. Intuitively, if excessive demand is available, each firm will produce at 
full capacity and needs not concern about competition. Consequently, all competitive policies are 
reduced to the single-firm policy. However, when the demand level is relatively low, the payoffs 
from different policies are quite different. From Figures 4 and 5, we observe that the payoffs from 
the single-single (sgl-sgl) policy combinations are close to those from security-security (s-s), Nash- 
Nash (N-N), and hazard-hazard (h-h) combinations. However, if Firm 2 plays its single policy 
and Firm 1 selects any one of its three competitive policies (e.g., security, Nash, or hazard), the 
payoff is low for Firm 2 and high for Firm 1. That shows the vulnerability of the control policies 
from the single-firm optimization model when competing against hose of competitive models. 
6. SUMMARY 
In this paper, we have studied a competitive production control problem. Two firms producing 
the same product compete against each other. Both firms are subject to random breakdowns 
and require random repair times. The production capacity of each firm is random due to the 
uncertainty in processing times and personnel changes. Customers arrive at the system following 
a stochastic process, and each unit of demand is randomly allocated between the two firms. We 
seek three policies for each individual firm, called security, hazard, and Nash polices. The security 
policy maximizes the minimum payoff, and the hazard policy maximizes the maximum payoff. 
They provide lower and upper bounds on the system performance in terms of maximizing profit 
for each individual firm. The Nash policies determine an equilibrium point such that there is no 
incentive for either firm to change its policy. Algorithms are developed to determine the policies 
and payoffs of interest. We also constructed a single-firm optimization model for the purpose of 
comparison. Through numerical solution and simulation, we analyzed the system performance 
under different policies in competition. From the cases we have considered, we observed that 
when the demand level is much higher than the system capacity, the competitive policies and the 
single-firm policy generate identical payoffs. That means that when excessive demand is available, 
what each firm needs to do is to maximize its profit without he concern about competition. This 
agrees with our intuition. However, we also observed that when the demand level is relatively 
low, the control policies from the single-firm optimization model is not effective in competition 
against hose from the competitive model. 
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